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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the degree to which a given industry’s labor contracts are complete 
or incomplete is the major factor determining whether its workforce will be unionized. 
For instance, assembly line industries feature complete labor contracts because of the 
nature of the production technology: Either a worker keeps up with the line, or he does 
not.  In such a situation, there is no chance for a reciprocal gift exchange under which 
firms offer high wages in exchange for high effort levels.  The result is low wages that 
make workers prone to unionization.  By contrast, jobs that feature incomplete contracts 
(lawyers, computer programmers, economists) already have reciprocity and gift exchange 
in place. Such benefits guarantee to workers that their better interests will be looked after 
by a management that wishes to maintain a positive and productive labor-management 
interaction. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
  Why do only some industries unionize?   
 
  This question has never been given a good theoretical answer.   
 
  While labor-management relations were transformed radically during the 19th and early 
20th centuries, no general theory exists to provide insight into the movement from craft 
guilds to large industrial unions that took place in the Industrialized Core during that 
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period.  Neither has a general theory been developed that can explain why certain 
industries were relatively easy for unions to organize, while others remained union free.  
So far, only ad hoc hypotheses have been advanced.  These discuss only how particular 
factors made particular industries at particular times prone to unionization.  A general 
theory is needed. 
 
  I will argue that recent advances in our understanding of how reciprocity affects 
behavior can be used to explain which industries unionized, and I will show how that 
process was driven by the introduction of mass production, which eliminated the 
reciprocal labor-management contracting institutions that had existed previously.  The 
key to this hypothesis is understanding how labor contract completeness affects the 
ability of workers and employers to engage in reciprocal gift exchanges of the type 
suggested by Akerlof (1982). 
 
  The importance of labor contract completeness was demonstrated in recent experiments 
by Fehr and Falk (1999).  They show that reciprocity can express itself only if labor 
contracts are incomplete.  Incomplete labor contracts allow workers to reciprocate high 
gift wages from employers with a gift of high effort levels.  Fehr and Falk report that in 
experimental games with incomplete contracts, such behavior is the norm.  Subjects 
acting as employers offer high gift wages, and subjects acting as workers reciprocate with 
high effort levels.  Moreover, they do so even if the games are fully anonymous, meaning 
they have no reason to be nice simply to build up future cooperation. 
 
  By contrast, if labor contracts are complete, workers have no way of reciprocating a 
high gift wage with high effort levels.  In otherwise identical games with complete 
contracts, wages offered by the subjects acting as employers are low.  The employers 
apparently understand that complete contracting eliminates the ability of workers to 
reciprocate.  As a result, the employers don’t bother to offer high gift wages to elicit high 
effort levels. 
 
  These results are very interesting because if you look around the economy, you tend to 
find unions in industries where there are complete contracts.  For instance, assembly line 
industries tend to be highly unionized.  My hypothesis suggests that this is true because 
an assembly line worker has no chance to put forth higher effort or increase his output 
because the line moves at its own pace, independent of anything he may wish to do.   
 
  By contrast, unions are rare in industries where there are incomplete labor contracts that 
allow for a gift exchange relationship between individual workers and their employers.  
This is true for most professionals (lawyers, doctors, economists), as well as most service 
workers. 
 
  The hypothesis that labor contract completeness determines unionization also explains 
the decline of craft unions and the rise of industrial unions in the U.S. automobile 
industry.  The key point is to realize that the change in union structure coincided with 
Henry Ford’s switch to assembly line production methods.  
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  Before the switch, cars had been assembled by skilled craftsmen working at their own 
pace in small shops.  During that period, an incomplete labor contracting regime 
prevailed under which employers could offer high gift wages in exchange for the gift of 
high effort levels.  The exchange of gifts kept workers happy and, as a result, union 
organizers had very little success organizing automobile workers. 
 
  The assembly line changed everything.  It eliminated any chance for individual workers 
to reciprocate high gift wages with high effort levels.  That, in turn, meant that firms no 
longer had an incentive to offer workers high gift wages in order to generate high effort 
levels. 
 
  This situation gave industrial trade unions the opportunity they needed.  Workers who 
are not being kept happy by gift wages are susceptible to unionization.  For Henry Ford 
and other industrialists, the shift to assembly line production was also a shift towards 
unionization. 
 
  The hypothesis I advance also suggests that you can view unionization as an 
institutional mechanism that can re-establish a gift-exchange relationship between 
workers and employers.  While the complete contracting that comes with assembly line 
production precludes such a relationship between individual workers and employers, 
unions allow for the possibility of a gift-exchange relationship between the collective 
mass of workers and employers.  
 
  This point matters because it offers an alternative explanation for the fact that union 
wages are higher than non-union wages.  The traditional view is that higher union wages 
are a type of rent, a payment in excess of productivity.  I argue that high union wages 
may in some cases be the result of a gift exchange.  Employers offer high gift wages that 
are reciprocated by unions that act to increase the productivity of the collective mass of 
workers. 
 
  Section 2 reviews Henry Ford’s introduction of the $5 daily wage at the same time he 
switched to mass production.  It explains why Ford believed that such a large pay 
increase was necessary to prevent the unionization of his workforce in the wake of the 
switch to the assembly line.  (Ford is used throughout the paper to demonstrate the 
applicability of reciprocity theory and labor contract completeness to the question of 
unionization.) 
 
  Section 3 reviews several labor market experiments that highlight the role of reciprocity 
between worker and employers.  As these results are introduced, they will be related to 
various empirical observations that have been made about labor-management relations 
and about the behavior of workers under various labor contracting regimes.  The key 
factor is shown to be the degree to which labor contracts are complete or incomplete. 
 
  Section 4 applies reciprocity theory to Henry Ford’s decision to offer the $5 daily wage.  
The case has already been convincingly made by Raff (1988) that Henry Ford offered 
that famously high wage to fight off unionization.  The question that reciprocity theory 
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can answer is:  Why did he have to fight off unionization at all?  The answer is that the 
switch to assembly line production meant complete labor contracts that eliminated 
reciprocity between individual workers and Ford Motors.  The section also argues that 
Ford later relented and stopped fighting unionization because he may have realized 
(consistent with experimental results) that it would be more profitable to pay lower wages 
and risk unionization. 
 
  Section 5 applies reciprocity theory more widely to other historical examples and notes 
that the introduction of more capital-intensive production methods in the late 19th century 
rang the death knell for craft unions but sounded the trumpet for the modern labor union.  
It also shows that reciprocity theory and labor contract completeness can be used to 
explain the low rate of unionization found among private sector service workers, as well 
as the high rate found among government sector service workers.   
 
  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The $5 Day at Ford Motor Company 
 
  In the winter of 1913-1914, Ford Motor Company switched to assembly line production.  
On January 5, 1914, Henry Ford raised the wages of his lowest paid employees from 
$2.34 per day to $5 per day.  Skilled workers received proportionate increases. 
 
  Raff (1988) argues in great detail that Ford’s decision to raise wages was a preemptive 
strike designed to prevent his workforce from being unionized.  Raff argues convincingly 
that the sudden and large wage increase cannot be explained by other factors, such as 
changes in supply and demand in the labor market, a desire to reduce labor turnover 
costs, the need to reduce adverse selection problems, or the preemption of shirking. 
 
  Why did Ford Motor Company have a threat of unionization that it needed to preempt?  
I propose that the very nature of assembly line production made Ford Motor Company 
vulnerable to unionization.  The vulnerability arose because the new production method 
destroyed the reciprocal labor-contracting institutions that had flourished before the 
assembly line.  It is no coincidence that Henry Ford increased wages at the same time he 
switched to the assembly line.  He realized that the new production method gave union 
organizers a much better chance of organizing his workers. 
 
 
2A. Mass production implies complete contracts 
 
  To see how technology drove this process, it is best to look back at the automobile 
industry before Henry Ford introduced the “American System” of production.  Ford 
Motor Company began in 1904 with a small shop of mechanics and artisans.  The first 
product was called the A and was followed by the B, the C, and so on up to the famous 
Model T, which was the car that initiated mass production using assembly lines.   
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  All Ford cars before the Model T had been handmade in small production runs.  The 
workers involved in production during that period were skilled craftsmen.  Industrial 
unions had tried futilely to organize them, but labor-management relations were handled 
through small craft unions that represented workers of the same occupation (core 
molders, for example).  Furthermore, the labor contracts applied to such workers were by 
their very nature incomplete contracts.  Wages were paid and output requited, but no 
close supervision of employees was cost-effectively possible, as each worker was a 
craftsman working at his own pace to produce a quality product. 
 
  Production was vastly different on the assembly line.  Each step in the production 
process required no great skill.  A Ford supervisor bragged in 1914 that he could in a very 
short time “make a first class molder of a man who has never before seen a core-molding 
bench in his life.”  Previous to this, core molding had been a skilled position, and the core 
molders had been represented by their own craft union. 
 
  In addition to eliminating the need for skilled workers, the assembly line also reduced 
the monitoring costs to zero.  If a worker did not keep up with the pace of the line, inputs 
piled up at his workstation.  Supervisors stationed on platforms overlooking the floor 
could immediately tell if a worker was not keeping up.  When any laggard was spotted, 
he was, according to Martin (1915), immediately replaced with substitutes who “were 
constantly kept on hand, at factory’s expense, to meet all emergencies.” 
 
  The switch from shop production to assembly line production was thus a switch from 
incomplete labor contracts to complete labor contracts.  In the former, input and output 
are only vaguely monitored.  In the latter, input and output are perfectly monitored, and 
there is immediate verification of shirking or inability on the part of workers. 
 
2B. Complete contracts eliminate gift wages and make unions more attractive 
 
  The switch from incomplete labor contracts to complete labor contracts also meant that 
it would no longer be possible to organize a gift exchange between individual workers 
and the employer.  Because the assembly line moved at its own pace, an individual 
worker could not reciprocate a gift of a high wage with a gift of high output.  That being 
the case, the employer was no longer motivated to offer a high gift wage to elicit high 
effort.1
 
  This point is crucial because gift wages are what appear to have staved off unionization 
under craft production.  As long as workers were receiving high gift wages, they were 
happy and not interested in joining an industrial union.  But with the shift to assembly 
line production, firms no longer had an incentive to give gift wages to motivate high 
effort.  Thus, the new production technology itself appears to have been the entrée needed 
by industrial union organizers, who had tried unsuccessfully to unionize automobile 
                                                 
1 But, as I argue below, a high gift wage could be used to elicit other gifts from workers.  In particular, 
Henry Ford appears to have raised the wages of unskilled workers to $5 per day as a gift designed to get 
them to resist union organizers. 
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workers throughout the craft production period.  Assembly lines meant complete 
contracts, which in turn created a workforce disposed to union organization. 
 
3. Reciprocity Theory and Labor Markets 
 
  The past 20 years have seen a profusion of experimental results that are inconsistent 
with the sort of selfish optimizing behavior that is presumed under standard, egocentric, 
utility-maximizing models of human behavior.  The behavior perhaps most inconsistent 
with standard theory has to do with costly punishing.  Players in experiments choose to 
punish players who they think are acting unfairly—even if applying the punishment is 
costly to the punisher, and even if games are structured so that players know there can be 
no future reward to punishing. 
 
  The most well-known example of this behavior comes from the ultimatum bargaining 
game, which was created by Güth et al (1982).  In that game, the two players involved 
have to agree on the division of some amount of money X.  The first player, A, makes a 
proposal to the second player, B, as to how to divide X.  Player B has only two possible 
responses: He can accept the division proposed by A, or he can reject the proposal.  If B 
rejects the proposal, then neither party receives any money at all. 
 
  Standard theory predicts that B will accept any proposal made by A because standard 
theory expects individuals to want to maximize their personal gain.  Any positive amount 
is better than receiving nothing (which is what B would get if he were to reject), so 
standard theory predicts that all offers will be accepted.   
 
  Standard theory is wrong.  A consistent result of the ultimatum game is that if the 
proposer A offers less than 30 percent of X to the responder B, then B rejects the offer.  
The standard theory fails because agents are interested in fairness and are willing to pay a 
cost—here, an opportunity cost—to avoid being treated unfairly. 
 
  Reciprocity theory attempts to capture the empirical regularity with which people 
reward positive treatment with positive responses and react to negative treatment with 
negative responses, even if those responses are costly and even if there is no long-term 
benefit to be had from revenge.2  The behavior of agents in the ultimatum game affords 
an example of negative reciprocity.  If A’s proposal seems unfair to B, then B 
reciprocates negatively by rejecting the offer and seeing to it that A is harmed by getting 
nothing. 
 
  Note that rejection in the ultimatum game is not some sort of repeated-game punishment 
strategy.  If B-type subjects think that they are being treated unfairly, they reject offers 
even if they know that they will never play the game again.  Their rejection is motivated 
                                                 
2 For definitions of reciprocity and evidence about reciprocal behavior in games, see Fehr and Gächter 
(2000), Cox and Deck (forthcoming), and especially Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2000), which reviews 
and tests the existing fairness theories to show that both intentions and outcomes matter to people when 
they evaluate the fairness of a situation. 
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by a vindictiveness that is unrelated to any attempts to train the A-types to make fairer 
offers in the future. 
 
  People are positively reciprocal, too, and positive reciprocity can be seen very clearly in 
the trust game, first run by Berg et al (1995).  In this game, a proposer receives X dollars 
from the experimenter.  The proposer can then offer any amount Y from [0, X] to the 
responder.  The experimenter then takes Y and triples it, so that the responder actually 
receives 3Y dollars.  The responder can then choose how much, if any, of that amount 3Y 
to send back to the proposer.  Standard theory makes the bleak, sub-game perfect 
prediction that because a selfish, maximizing responder would never send any money 
back to the proposer, the proposer should never send any money to the responder.   
 
  Here, again, standard theory fails.  When this experiment is conducted, proposers send 
money, and responders send money back.  Moreover, there is a positive relationship 
between the amount of money sent by the proposer and the amount of money sent back 
by the responder:  The more generous the proposer is to the responder, the more 
generously the responder reciprocates. 
 
  That is not to say, however, that money is sent over by all proposers or that money is 
sent back by all responders. Repeated experiments have shown that between 20 and 30 
percent of subjects in trust games do not reciprocate.  These subjects behave completely 
selfishly and according to standard theory.  On the other hand, the same studies have 
found that between 40 and 66 percent of subjects behave reciprocally (see Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000).  This paper focuses on how reciprocal behavior affects the propensity of 
workers to unionize.  
 
  The major point is that the introduction of mass production destroyed the previous 
labor-management relationship that had been based upon reciprocity and under which 
management had paid higher-than-minimal wages.  Under that system, workers had taken 
those higher-than-minimal wages as a token of consideration, and they reciprocated by 
working with more-than-minimal effort.  The assembly line ruined that system because it 
made both positive and negative reciprocity by individual workers impossible.  There 
was neither any way to reciprocate positively by working better or faster, nor any way to 
reciprocate negatively by shirking. 
 
  But before applying reciprocity theory to the case of Ford Motor Company, let us 
review some experimental results on labor supply that greatly illuminate Henry Ford’s 
decision to offer the $5 daily wage.  These results are important because they highlight 
the fact that reciprocal behavior can take place only under incomplete labor contracts.  By 
contrast, with complete contracts, everything is specified, and there is no room for the 
contracting parties to behave reciprocally, either positively or negatively. 
 
3A. The importance of incomplete contracts in generating gift wages 
 
  Akerlof (1982), Leibenstein (1987), and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) argue that labor 
markets are prone to gift exchanges in which employers offer pay wages in excess of 
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labor’s opportunity cost, a behavior that elicits the reciprocal gift of higher-than-minimal 
effort on the part of workers.3  A key assumption underlying this line of thinking is that 
labor contracts are incomplete, so that poorly paid workers have the option of reducing 
their effort levels. In a complete labor contract, no such reductions are possible. 
 
  The critical effect that labor contract completeness or incompleteness has on wages is 
demonstrated by a series of experiments run by Fehr and Falk (1999).  They show that 
wages are much higher under incomplete contracts—even in the presence of a large 
excess labor supply. The authors demonstrate this by running a competitive double oral 
auction to set wage rates, first in a treatment in which all contracts between workers and 
employers are incomplete, and then in a treatment in which all contracts between workers 
and employers are complete. 
 
  In both treatments, there are eight firms and 12 workers.  Because each firm can employ 
only one worker, there is always an excess supply of labor, and you should consequently 
expect to see low wages.  More specifically, the experiment was set up so that each 
worker faces a cost of contracting of 20.  Consequently, with the given excess supply (12 
workers but only eight jobs), the competitive wage level should be driven down to 20 
under standard theory.4
 
  Under the complete contract treatment, workers had to provide the contracted effort 
level because it would be monitored by firms that could impose stiff penalties for 
shirking.  By contrast, the incomplete contract treatment was much like a trust game. 
After the wage contract was concluded, workers could choose any effort level they 
wanted because employers had no way to penalize workers who provided less effort than 
they promised when they contracted. 
 
  In either treatment, higher effort on the part of workers results in higher profits for the 
firm.  This allows for the possibility of a mutually beneficial gift exchange in the 
incomplete contract case.  Such a gift exchange would feature firms offering high wages 
in exchange for high effort.  If such a gift exchange were to take place, you would expect 
to find higher wages in the incomplete contract treatment. However, given the huge 
excess supply of labor, standard theory would suggest that in either treatment competition 
between workers would drive wages down to their minimum level of 20.  It is interesting 
to see once again how badly standard theory fails. 
                                                 
3 Efficiency wage theory can be divided into two streams of thought.  The first was developed by Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), Bowles (1985), Fehr (1986), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and others.  Under this 
“shirking” version, there is a moral hazard problem, and firms pay high (incentive compatible) wages to 
prevent workers from shirking.  The Akerlof (1982) version of efficiency wages may be termed the “fair-
wage/effort” version.  Under this version, if workers think wages are unfairly low, their effort falls.  
Consequently, raising wages can increase effort in some situations.  Experimental evidence supports both 
versions of the efficiency wage hypothesis (see Fehr and Gächter 2005). 
4 Individual workers would be indifferent to a contracted wage of 20 because their wage of 20 would just 
equal their cost of working of 20.  Therefore, they would gain from any contracted wage higher than 20 and 
would lose if they contracted for a wage less than 20.  Given these facts and the excess supply of labor, one 
would expect wages to be driven down to 20. 
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Figure 1 
 
  Figure 1 shows that average wage levels are much higher under the incomplete contract 
regime than under the complete contract regime.  In addition, Figure 1 also shows the 
wage offers proposed by each of the workers in each period.  As you can see, employers 
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tended to take the lowest offer under the complete contract regime, but chose to accept 
offers substantially higher than the lowest offer under the incomplete contract regime.5  
The result is that incomplete contracts are associated with much higher equilibrium wage 
levels.  This appears to happen because incomplete labor contracts allow positive 
reciprocity to manifest itself. 
 
  Under a complete labor contract, workers cannot take revenge against their miserly 
employers by giving poor effort.  Under an incomplete contract, however, workers can 
take such revenge if they feel that they have been treated unfairly.  The upshot is that 
firms are reluctant to accept a low wage bid. Firms operating under an incomplete 
contracting regime do not accept the lowest wage offers because doing so would mean 
hiring workers who would likely be disgruntled and not put forth high effort.   
 
  Instead, firms choose to pay high wages.  A gift exchange takes place under which firms 
pay higher-than-minimal wages, and in return workers provide higher-than-minimal 
effort.  Interestingly, the net effect is that firm profits are higher in the incomplete 
contracting case than in the complete contracting case.  The higher level of output 
produced by happy, well-paid workers more than makes up for paying them high gift 
wages. 
 
3B. Higher profits call for higher gift wages 
 
  By raising wages above the minimum level of 20 in Figure 1, incomplete contracts 
generate gift wages for workers.  It turns out that the size of gift wages varies directly 
with firm profitability. This is demonstrated by Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1996), 
who present results similar to those above, except that the various firms offering 
employment have differing profit opportunities.  The authors find a strong positive 
correlation between profit opportunities and the size of the gift wages paid to workers. 
 
  While this result is not compatible with competitive theories of wage determination, it 
can easily be explained as a result of gift exchange taking place under incomplete 
contracts.  As argued by Akerlof (1982), whether a given wage is perceived as generous 
enough to be counted by workers as a gift depends on the circumstances.  In particular, 
workers in very profitable firms feel entitled to share in the companies’ success.  
Consequently, successful firms have to pay their workers higher gift wages than do less 
successful firms. 
 
  This hypothesis is useful in explaining the well-documented fact that workers in 
profitable firms and industries are paid more than workers in similar jobs in less 
successful firms and industries, even after taking account of differences among workers 
in terms of skills and human capital (see Dickens and Katz 1987 and Krueger and 
Summers 1988).   
                                                 
5 Moreover, people seem to know this implicitly.  In Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2000), when subjects acting 
as firms were given the choice of whether to offer a complete or an incomplete contract, they almost always 
chose to offer the incomplete contract--despite the fact that they knew nothing of previous experimental 
results that showed that firm profits are higher under incomplete contracts. 
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  The hypothesis is also relevant for analyzing Henry Ford’s decision to so precipitously 
raise wages in January, 1914.  The reason is that Ford Motor Company was by far the 
most profitable firm in its industry, as you can see by looking at Table 1, which 
reproduces Table 3 of Raff (1988) and gives automobile manufacturers’ profits both 
annually and weekly circa 1913, about the time that Henry Ford decided to increase 
wages.   
 
  The size of Ford’s profits gives some hint as to why Ford felt that he had to so 
dramatically raise wages in order to keep his workforce resistant to unionization.  He 
seems to have understood that his wage hike had to be quite large if it was to be 
perceived as a gift.  Thus, reciprocity theory can explain not only why Ford felt the need 
to offer a gift wage to prevent unionization, but also why that gift wage was so large. 
 
 
Table 1 
Profits of U.S. Auto Makers,  
circa January 1913 
 
Company Annual Profit Weekly 
Profit 
Ford $27,087,204 $541,744 
General Motors 8,184,054 183,911 
Willys-Overland 5,864,858 131,911 
Packard 2,364,568 53,136 
Studebaker 1,905,413 42,818 
   Source: Raff (1988)    
  
3C. Monitoring for shirking ruins reciprocity 
 
  I argue above that reciprocity can explain experimental results that traditional self-
interest theory cannot.  Furthermore, when it is allowed to operate in an incomplete 
contract environment, reciprocity can lead to outcomes much better for both workers and 
firms than those that would prevail under complete contracts.  In particular, reciprocity 
means that workers can get high gift wages, and firms can get high profits (thanks to the 
high effort levels provided by workers pleased by their high gift wages). 
 
  It might be imagined that explicit disincentives could also be used to motivate workers.  
However, Fehr and Gächter (2000) find that when disincentives are added to an 
incomplete contract game in which reciprocity is possible, the presence of disincentives 
by itself destroys reciprocal behavior.  To highlight the effect of disincentives, they play 
two games that are identical except that one allows employers to punish workers for 
shirking.  
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  The game without punishment is an incomplete contract game in which firms offer a 
wage contract that requests that the worker expend some level e of effort.  If a worker 
accepts the contract, however, there is nothing to prevent the worker from giving only the 
minimal effort elow= 1 because workers can’t be punished in this version. 
 
  As with other incomplete contract games, reciprocal behavior was observed when this 
game was played.  Figure 2 (which reproduces Figure 3 of Fehr and Gächter 2000) gives 
the results of the game in the solid black dots.  The figure shows that the higher the wage 
offered by firms on the horizontal axis, the higher the effort level with which employees 
reciprocated on the vertical axis.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The horizontal axis is labeled “Firms’ Offered Rents” rather than “Firms’ Offered Wages” because Fehr 
and Gächter (2000) measure the amount by which wages exceed the minimum that would be necessary to 
get workers to give only the minimum effort level elow.  They refer to any wage in excess of this minimum 
as a rent.  I reserve the word rent for situations in which workers are being paid more than their marginal 
product.  Because gift wages can sometimes elicit an increase in productivity that is large enough to more 
than pay for the gift, gift wages are not necessarily rent.  
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Figure 2 
 
 
  Behavior is very different in the version of the game that allows punishment.  The 
punishment mechanism used in the game allows employers to stipulate in the wage 
contract a fine that will be paid if workers are verified to have shirked (by providing less 
than the effort level e desired by the firm).  In addition, all parties know that the 
probability of verification given shirking is one-third. 
 
  As can be seen by the hollow circles in Figure 2, allowing employers to punish shirkers 
destroys reciprocal behavior.  Workers no longer react to higher wage offers by putting 
forth higher effort levels. 
 
  To explain this result, Fehr and Gächter (2000) speculate that explicit disincentives 
“may cause a hostile atmosphere of threat and distrust, which reduces reciprocity-based 
extra effort.”  What is even more striking is that reciprocity is destroyed by just a one-
third chance of getting caught when shirking. This probability is much less than the 
nearly 100 percent chance of getting caught when shirking on a Ford assembly line.  
Indeed, it offers a second reason why you should not expect reciprocity when there are 
complete labor contracts. 
 
  The first reason was given above: The assembly line made reciprocal behavior 
impossible for individual workers because there was no way for any one worker to 
improve his output quantity or quality to reciprocate for a gift of high wages.  To that 
result must now be added the conclusion that even had the individual worker been able to 
reciprocate in some way, he likely would have chosen not to do so because the assembly 
line provided Ford Motor Company with highly effective ways to monitor and thereby 
penalize underperformance.  
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4. Reciprocity and the $5 Day at Ford 
 
  Raff (1988) demonstrates that preempting unionization is the only logical motive that 
can explain why Ford raised the pay of his workforce so drastically. Having reviewed the 
relevant experimental results about reciprocity theory, incomplete contracts, and contract 
disincentives, we are now in a position to elaborate on why Henry Ford felt the need to 
offer a $5 daily wage in order to preempt the unionization of his workforce.  These ideas 
can also explain why Ford Motor Company was the only firm in its industry that needed 
to undertake such a policy, why such a policy proved successful at preventing 
unionization, and even why the policy was eventually abandoned.   
 
4A. The assembly line is a complete contract 
 
  Why was Ford Motors uniquely vulnerable to unionization and in need of taking 
preemptive action against unionization?  Reciprocity theory suggests that Ford was 
uniquely vulnerable in 1914 because it was the only car maker to have switched to 
assembly line production.  It was thus the only firm in its industry to have destroyed the 
previous incomplete contract labor regime.  In its place, assembly line production created 
complete contracts that precluded the possibility of reciprocal behavior between Ford 
Motor Company and individual Ford employees. 
 
  The end of reciprocity resulted from two changes.  First, a line worker would expend 
only the minimal effort needed to keep up with the line.  If he worked any less hard, he 
would be fired.  Attempting to work any harder would have been futile, as he could affect 
neither the quantity nor the quality of the final product by any personal effort.  
Consequently, Ford Motor Company had no incentive to pay gift wages in order to get 
any particular employee to expend more effort on his job.  Because workers could not 
reciprocate, there was no point in giving a gift wage to encourage higher effort. 
 
  Second, the technology of the assembly line brought with it low monitoring costs and a 
nearly 100 percent chance of catching shirking workers.  As demonstrated by Fehr and 
Gächter (2000), monitoring workers ruins reciprocity.  But Ford had no choice. 
Monitoring had to be done.  Ford supervisors hawkishly watched every station on the line 
because if even one station made an error or moved too slowly, the whole line could 
come to a halt.  The result was a high-monitoring labor environment inconsistent with 
reciprocity. 
 
4B. Preempting unionization by paying a group gift wage 
   
  With the death of reciprocity between the employer and individual workers, Ford Motor 
Company became uniquely vulnerable to unionization.  Ford’s competitors, all of which 
were still using craft workshops to produce automobiles, could rely on reciprocity to keep 
their workers happy.  They could pay high wages to individual workers and expect that 
those individual workers would reciprocate by expending a great deal of effort in 
producing a good product.  Firms could also expect that union organizers would be 
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ignored by happy, positively reciprocating workers.  If unions exist to raise wages, then 
they are of little benefit to workers who are already receiving high wages thanks to 
reciprocal gift exchange.  
 
  This explains why raising wages to $5 per day was a good way to prevent unionization.  
Doing so established a new gift-exchange relationship to replace the one that had been 
destroyed by the adoption of the assembly line.  In exchange for the generous gift of high 
wages, workers would reciprocate by ignoring union organizers.  After all, union 
organizers could hardly argue that they could raise wages much higher than Henry Ford 
had already done. 
 
  The key point, however, is that reciprocal relationships between an individual worker 
and the firm were not possible under the assembly line method of production.  If any gift 
exchange were to take place, it had to take place between the firm and the workers as a 
group.  That is why wages were raised across the board, for all workers. 
 
  Finally, it must be reiterated that Ford Motors had a unique problem. This can be 
gathered from the fact that after Ford Motors raised wages, no other car manufacturer 
followed suit.  That is, not one of the competitors still utilizing craft-based production 
methods felt any need to raise wages. 
 
4C. The eventual unionization of Ford 
 
  Henry Ford did not maintain a policy of high gift wages in the years after 1914.  In fact, 
wages were barely raised at all in the coming decade, such that by the mid 1920s, union 
organizers were making steady progress at Ford’s factories.  Given that Ford was 
originally willing to pay high gift wages to prevent the unionization of his workforce, 
why did he not continue with this policy?   
 
  Quite simply, Henry Ford probably figured out another lesson of the experiment run by 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) that isn’t visible in Figure 2: Although worker effort is lower in 
the complete contract game, profits are higher because the cost savings from not having 
to pay high, gift-exchange wages more than makes up for the reduction in output due to 
low effort.  Stated a bit differently, while it was the case that workers in the incomplete 
contract treatment did give higher effort for higher wages, those increases in effort 
weren’t nearly enough to justify the higher wages used to bring them about. 
 
  Ford may have discovered over time that the potential costs of dealing with a 
disgruntled workforce (to whom he did not pay gift wages) were less expensive than the 
costs involved in paying the gift wages necessary to keep unions out of his factories.  
This is especially likely to have been the case given the low-cost monitoring available 
under assembly line production and the fact that because the speed of the line was fixed, 
workers could not respond to Ford’s 1914 gift wage by increasing production.  As a 
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result, Ford’s gift wages necessarily reduced Ford’s profits.  Ford most likely ended the 
policy of gift wages when he figured this out.7
 
5. Explaining Which Industries Unionize 
 
  Above, I discuss how reciprocity and labor contract completeness can be used to explain 
Henry Ford’s decisions to implement and then abandon a policy of high gift wages. I will 
now argue that reciprocity and labor contract completeness can give a general 
explanation of why only certain industries unionize. 
 
  The key appears to be that only those industries in which it is difficult to establish a gift-
exchange relationship between employers and individual workers are prone to 
unionization.  Three broad categories of jobs seem to fit this description: 
 
• Jobs in industries like automobile manufacturing where reciprocal gift exchange 
is precluded because of the nature of the production process.   
 
• Government jobs in which the gift-exchange relationship is not available because 
all workers in a group are paid essentially the same and promoted essentially the 
same without regard for ability or exertion. 
 
• Jobs in acting and construction, two industries in which output is instantly visible 
and is therefore subject to complete monitoring.   
 
  I will discuss each case in its own subsection.  
 
5A. Some production processes preclude reciprocity 
 
  Figure 1 shows that the high wages that accrue to workers under an incomplete 
contracting regime disappear when a switch is made to complete contracts.  Because 
unions are a mechanism by which high wages can be restored, you should expect to find 
them in situations in which a production process precludes reciprocal gift exchange and 
the high wages that it generates.   
 
  Aside from assembly line industries, piece rate industries are perhaps the best examples 
of complete contracts leading to high rates of unionization. For example, you see high 
rates of unionization in the garment industry where seamstresses are paid per shirt made, 
as well as in the mining industry, where workers are paid per ton mined.   
 
  The reason union organizers do so well in these industries is because piecework 
precludes reciprocal gift exchange between individual workers and employers.  Once the 
piece rate is set, workers can only produce more or less. They cannot offer higher quality 
                                                 
7 Ford likely chose to end the policy gradually by not raising wages for a decade (rather than immediately 
cutting wages down to non-gift levels) because to have cut wages drastically down to non-gift levels would 
have immediately antagonized his workforce and made it prone to unionization. 
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to the employer.  And there is no way for workers to modulate effort in a way that will 
hurt employers without hurting themselves, because any reduction in output only lowers 
the worker’s own wages.  Piece rates are therefore complete contracts that destroy the 
prospects for reciprocal gift exchange.  And without gift exchange keeping workers 
happy, they are prone to unionization. 
 
  By unionizing, workers in such industries may be able to obtain higher wages.  But if 
higher wages are achieved, should they be considered gift exchange or rent?  The answer 
depends upon whether the higher wages are met with higher productivity.   
 
  Recent work suggests that, in at least some cases, unions can indeed raise productivity 
in exchange for higher wages.  Notably, Black and Lynch (2001) find, in a representative 
sample of U.S. firms that unionized, firms that adopted joint decision-making coupled 
with incentive-based compensation had higher productivity than non-union plants that 
undertook similar policies.  Similarly, Hamilton et al (2003) show that a unionized firm 
that switched from individual piece rates to group piece rates showed a 14 percent 
increase in productivity. 
 
  On the other hand, a recent meta survey by Doucouliagos and Larouche (2003) of 
papers investigating the relationship between unionization and efficiency found no 
overall effect when examining 79 studies covering eight countries.  Consequently, the 
hypothesis advanced in this paper can confidently explain only how the absence of a gift 
exchange between individual workers and employers can lead to unionization.  Whether 
the union can facilitate an aggregate gift exchange of higher pay for higher output 
between the workers as a group and the firm is less certain.  However, given the large 
difference in productivity between incomplete and complete labor contracts, such a 
possibility is tantalizing. 
 
5B. Why private service sector workers aren’t very unionized 
 
  In the latter half of the 20th century, the fraction of the U.S. labor force that was 
unionized steadily declined.8  This decline has been ascribed to the ongoing movement of 
GNP away from manufacturing industries towards the service sector: As workers moved 
from the heavily unionized manufacturing sector towards the lightly unionized service 
sector, the overall fraction of unionized workers necessarily declined.9   
 
  But this explanation begs the question:  Why are service industries less unionized than 
manufacturing industries? 
 
                                                 
8 Only 13.5 percent of all U.S. workers were union members in 2000.  This represents a very large decrease 
from a high of almost 36 percent in the early 1950s.  
9 In 1950, 45 percent of the non-agricultural labor force was employed in the service sector, while 65 
percent was employed in the goods-producing sector. In 2001, the service sector accounted for more than 
80 percent of the non-agricultural labor force, while the goods-producing sector employed less than 20 
percent. 
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  I propose that the difference in unionization rates between service industries and 
manufacturing industries can be ascribed to the fact that most labor contracts in service 
industries are incomplete labor contracts, while most labor contracts in manufacturing 
industries are complete labor contracts.  The incomplete labor contracts found in service 
industries lead to reciprocal gift exchanges that keep wages high and workers happy.  By 
contrast, the complete labor contracts found in manufacturing industries preclude the high 
wages generated by reciprocal gift exchange.  The result is that workers in manufacturing 
industries are much more willing to join unions than workers in service industries. 
 
5C. Why government service sector workers are heavily unionized 
 
  The major exception to the lack of unionization in the service sector is the high rate of 
unionization among government workers in the United States.  Because nearly all U.S. 
government employees are service workers, the 37.5 percent unionization rate found 
among government workers would at first glance appear to be totally inconsistent with 
the low unionization rates found among service workers in the private sector.   
 
  It would also appear to contradict my contention that unions tend to arise only when 
there are complete labor contracts.  After all, don’t government workers have incomplete 
labor contracts like most other service sector workers?   
 
  I would say no.  The civil service rules that cover government jobs create what is 
essentially a complete labor contract. Indeed, working for the government is a lot like 
doing piecework because promotion and pay increases are largely independent of effort.   
 
  For instance, under the compensation schemes used in public schools, the best high 
school teacher is paid the same as the worst if both have worked for the same number of 
years.  Similarly, the firefighter in the neighborhood with the petroleum refinery is paid 
the same as the firefighter across town in the neighborhood where the buildings never 
burn. 
 
  Such effort-independent wage payments preclude gift exchange between the 
government and its individual employees.  Without the ability to tailor pay to individual 
output, government managers cannot offer individual workers the gift of a higher wage in 
exchange for greater effort.   
 
  Consequently, I think that it’s not surprising that service unions have had much better 
luck organizing public sector service workers than they’ve had organizing private sector 
service workers.  While managers of service firms in the private sector can engage in gift-
exchange incomplete contracts with individual workers, government managers, required 
by law to pay the same wage to huge numbers of workers despite manifest differences in 
ability and competence, cannot engage in gift exchange.  The result is that government 
service workers are much more prone to unionization.10
                                                 
10 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, this explanation for the high rate of unionization in the case of 
government service workers must be placed in context by noting that governments are often much less 
averse to seeing their workforces unionize than are private sector employers.  The theory presented here is 
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  It is interesting to note that under my hypothesis, the civil service protections given to 
government workers are the cause of the unionization of government workers.  Along 
these lines, one can understand the great protests made by unions whenever plans are 
announced to outsource government jobs to the private sector.  
 
  Any time such a plan is announced, union organizers complain bitterly.  This paper 
suggests that they are so vociferous because they realize that if these jobs are moved to 
private-sector firms, which are free to engage in incomplete labor contracts, workers 
doing those jobs will be much less likely to join a union.  By contrast, if the jobs stay in 
the governmental sector, they will continue to have the civil service protections that make 
it extremely difficult to maintain a gift exchange between individual workers and 
government managers.  It is for this reason that unions complain so loudly when service 
jobs are transferred from the government to the private sector.11
 
5D. All the world’s a stage: Full monitoring for construction workers and actors 
 
  Construction and performance are the two private-sector industries where unionization 
rates remain high in the United States.  Construction workers, be they painters, 
carpenters, bricklayers, or steelworkers, are organized into guilds and unions that are very 
strong and able to demand very high wages.  Similarly, actors and musicians have been 
organized into effective unions since ancient times,12 and today every sort of actor and 
musician in the United States is compelled to join the appropriate union or be without 
work.   
 
  What both of these occupations share is immediate and full monitoring.  This is most 
obvious in the case of performers.  If they are not good, they will be immediately 
recognized as such, and they will not get paid.  Quite simply, they do not have the chance 
for a reciprocal contracting relationship because of the complete monitoring that goes 
along with their jobs.  Whereas workers in most jobs can choose to shirk and expend low 
effort, performers cannot. 
 
  The situation is similar for construction workers.  Any bricklayer who does not lay 
straight rows of bricks will be fired immediately, as will any carpenter who cannot make 
a joint square.  The labor contract is complete, and unions are a natural response. 
   
6. Conclusions 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a contribution because it gives an intuition for why government workforces may be more prone to 
unionization than private sector workforces, independent of their respective employers’ feelings about 
unionization. 
11 A similar thing happened in the private sector at Harvard a few years ago when the university decided to 
outsource food service work and janitorial services.  A great union-led outcry arose because university 
employees are easier to organize than private sector workers. 
12 Pliny the Elder reports that musicians and actors in ancient Rome and Greece were organized into guilds 
demanding minimal daily payment rates. 
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  This paper argues that workers laboring under a complete labor contract will be more 
receptive to unionization than are workers laboring under an incomplete labor contract.  
The difference stems from the fact that gift exchange between workers and employers is 
possible only under incomplete labor contracts.   
 
  Under incomplete labor contracts, employers offer high gift wages that are reciprocated 
by workers offering high effort levels.  Because reciprocal gift exchange keeps wages 
high and workers happy, unions have little to offer workers in such situations, and 
unionization rates are consequently very low. 
 
  By contrast, gift exchanges are not possible under complete labor contracts.  Wages are 
much lower, and workers are much less happy.  The result is that unions have much 
greater success organizing workers in industries that feature complete labor contracts.   
 
  The history of unionization at Ford Motor Company supports the hypothesis that labor 
contract completeness is the major factor determining whether or not workers will want 
to unionize.  Before the assembly line, production was done by skilled craft workers 
working under incomplete labor contracts.  This allowed for a reciprocal gift exchange 
that kept wages high and workers happy.  As a result, industrial unionization was non-
existent despite the best attempts of union organizers.   
 
  As shown by Raff (1988), however, when Henry Ford decided to switch to assembly 
line production, he also felt the need to offer an extremely high $5 per day wage to 
prevent unionization.  This paper argues that the reason he offered the wage increase at 
the same time that he switched to assembly line production was because he realized that 
the new production method involved a complete labor contract.  Assembly line workers 
could not reciprocate a gift of higher wages with higher effort because the speed of the 
line was fixed.   
 
  Ford apparently understood that the new production method would destroy the previous 
incomplete contracting regime and make his workforce prone to unionization.  The $5 
daily wage was Ford’s preventative strike.  If he paid high wages on his own, union 
organizers couldn’t promise much improvement. 
 
  The decline of unions in the second half of the 20th century can also be explained in 
terms of complete and incomplete labor contracts.  As workers moved from 
manufacturing jobs that featured complete labor contracts and high rates of unionization 
to service sector jobs that featured incomplete labor contracts and low rates of 
unionization, the overall rate of unionization in the economy fell.   
 
  In addition, the high rate of unionization found among governmental service sector 
employees can be explained as the result of civil service protections preempting the 
opportunity for reciprocal gift exchange.  Because promotion and pay increases are tied 
to tenure rather than performance, government managers cannot exchange gifts of high 
wages for gifts of high effort on the part of workers.   
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  Finally, the high rate of unionization among construction workers and performance 
artists can also be explained as a result of complete contracts.  Reciprocal gift exchange is 
stifled in both industries by the immediate and complete monitoring of output. 
 
  If complete contracts are indeed the major factor leading to unionization, then 
unionization may offer a tantalizing way to obtain the productivity gains that accrue 
under reciprocal gift exchange.  In situations like assembly line production where the 
production technology itself involves a complete contract between individual workers 
and the employer, there is no chance for productivity-enhancing reciprocal gift exchange.  
If a union is formed, however, the situation is completely transformed because the 
relationship between the union as a whole and the employer is that of an incomplete 
contract, in the sense that the union can shirk by striking or offer to raise productivity in 
exchange for concessions.  In such a situation, a renewal of reciprocal gift exchange 
between the union as a whole and the employer may be possible.   
 
  This is no small matter given that productivity in experimental games can be so much 
higher under incomplete contracts than under complete contracts.  Indeed, the switch 
from complete contracts (between individual workers and employers) to incomplete 
contracts (between unions and employers) that takes place when firms unionize may help 
to explain why unionization appears to raise firm productivity in some real world cases.  
Further research along these lines is needed. 
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